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HOW DOES PARENTAL LEAVE AFFECT FERTILITY AND
RETURN TO WORK? EVIDENCE FROM TWO NATURAL
EXPERIMENTS∗
RAFAEL LALIVE AND JOSEF ZWEIMU¨LLER
This paper analyzes the effects of changes in the duration of paid, job-protected
parental leave on mothers’ higher-order fertility and postbirth labor market ca-
reers. Identification is based on a major Austrian reform increasing the duration
of parental leave from one year to two years for any child born on or after July 1,
1990. We find that mothers who give birth to their first child immediately after
the reform have more second children than prereform mothers, and that extended
parental leave significantly reduces return to work. Employment and earnings also
decrease in the short run, but not in the long run. Fertility and work responses
vary across the population in ways suggesting that both cash transfers and job
protection are relevant. Increasing parental leave for a future child increases
fertility strongly but leaves short-run postbirth careers relatively unaffected. Par-
tially reversing the 1990 extension, a second 1996 reform improves employment
and earnings while compressing the time between births.
I. INTRODUCTION
Working parents of a newborn child have to give full attention
to their baby and their jobs. Aiming to address this double burden
for working parents, most OECD countries offer parental-leave
(PL) provisions. However, although countries agree that parents
of small children need support, the design of current PL systems
differs strongly across countries. The purpose of this paper is to
provide information on one key aspect of PL. We ask how PL
duration affects a working mother who has just given birth to
her first child. By studying the decision to give birth to a sec-
ond child, we can provide information on the role of PL policy for
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higher-order births. This analysis is important for countries with
fertility rates below the replacement level. Studying mothers’ re-
turn to work, postbirth employment, and postbirth labor earnings,
the paper provides information on how PL duration affects sub-
sequent work careers of working women. This analysis allows
assessment of the extent to which extending parental leave fa-
cilitates balancing work and life. Moreover, studying the effects
of parental leave on both fertility and work allows us to assess
whether institutions that shape the terms of postbirth female em-
ployment spill over to fertility.
Our analysis is based on the Austrian PL system. Under Aus-
trian PL rules women can stay off work and return to the same (or
a similar) job at the same employer thereafter. During the leave
they receive a flat PL benefit of 340 euros per month. Interest-
ingly, Austrian policymakers implemented two major reforms of
the duration of PL—an extension of PL duration in 1990 and a
reduction of PL duration in 1996. Specifically, before July 1, 1990,
the maximum duration of PL ended with the child’s first birthday.
The 1990 reform extended PL until the child’s second birthday
for all children born on or after July 1. The 1996 reform partially
reversed the extension granted in 1990 by taking away the last
six months added in 1990.
These policy changes create natural experiments that allow
us to assess how changes in PL duration affect fertility decisions
of a mother who has just given birth to a newborn child. Extending
PL duration affects this decision in two different ways. First, the
probability of a higher-order birth is potentially determined by
the PL duration for the baby that is already born. This is what we
call the current-child effect. This effect is potentially important in
the Austrian context because women who give birth no later than
3.5 months after the end of a previous PL are exempt from the
work requirement and can automatically renew PL eligibility for
the second child. Before the 1990 reform, mothers needed to give
birth to a new child within 15.5 months. Such a tight spacing of
children is both biologically difficult and not desired by many par-
ents. The 1990 reform increased this period to 27.5 months, thus
providing much broader access to automatic renewal. The 1996
reform reduced the automatic renewal period to 21.5 months—a
space between births that is biologically feasible and potentially
desired. Second, the probability of a higher-order birth is also
determined by PL duration for the baby yet to be born. This is
what we call the future-child effect. Because PL duration directly
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affects the costs associated with childbearing, the future-child ef-
fect is expected to increase fertility.
This paper also studies how PL rules affect postbirth labor
market careers of mothers with newborn children. The 1990 ex-
tension of leave encourages a mother to stay home with her child
in the second year after birth and to delay return to work sub-
stantially. Future employment and labor earnings will be affected
in two ways. First, providing parents with extended PL encour-
ages mothers to stay off work longer and lowers employment and
labor earnings immediately after a birth. This short-run effect is
mechanical and intended by policy makers. Second, prolonged pe-
riods of absence from the workplace may lead to skill depreciation
and weaker labor market prospects after labor market reentry.
This potential for long-run deterioration of women’s postbirth ca-
reers is clearly not intended by policy.
Although family policies in many countries are designed to
support low-income (and often nonworking) women, the Austrian
case is interesting because it affects working women of all income
groups. However, it is not a priori clear for which group the PL
rules generate the strongest incentives. The flat PL benefit implies
that lower-income parents have a higher earnings replacement ra-
tio. To shed light on the importance of cash transfers, we look at
differences in response between high- and low-income women. The
job protection policy may be more important for career-oriented
women. This is because job protection shields working women
from future income losses due to firm-specific human capital de-
preciation or deferred payment contracts. To shed light on the
importance of job protection, we look at differences in responses
between blue- and white-collar women. As firm-specific human
capital and internal labor markets are arguably more important
in white-collar professions, we would expect stronger responses
from white-collar women.
The empirical analysis draws on a unique and very informa-
tive data set, the Austrian Social Security Database (ASSD). Set
up to provide information to calculate pension benefits for private
sector employees (about 80% of Austrian employment), the ASSD
collects detailed information on a woman’s earnings and employ-
ment history from employers; and it also contains information on
take-up of PL benefits and on a woman’s fertility history from the
point of time when she first worked in the private sector. We ex-
tract information on PL-eligible women who gave birth to the first
child observed in ASSD in periods that cover the reform, and we
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analyze subsequent fertility and labor market outcomes both in
the short run (three years after the first birth) and in the long run
(ten years after the first birth).
Our empirical analysis uncovers five key results. First, we
find that the extension of PL enacted in July 1990 had a strong
impact on subsequent fertility behavior. We find that both the
current-child PL effect and the future-child PL effect are quan-
titatively large. In the short run (within three years) fertility in-
creases by 5 percentage points (15%) as a result of extended leave
on the current child and by 7 percentage points (21%) as a result
of extending leave for the future child. Second, we find not only
that fertility increases temporarily, but also that this increase
persists in the long run. Among women eligible for the more gen-
erous PL rules, three out of 100 women gave birth to an additional
child within ten years after the birth of the first child who would
not have done so with short leave. Although we do not observe
the completed fertility cycles of mothers, we conclude that it is
quite likely that the policy change affected not only the timing
but also the number of births. Third, we find that most mothers
exhaust the full duration of their leaves and that return to work
is substantially delayed even after PL has been exhausted (by 10
percentage points in the short run and by 3 percentage points in
the long run). Interestingly, although work experience and earn-
ings decrease strongly in the short run, we do not find that longer
leaves have long-run effects on work experience and cumulative
earnings. Fourth, there are differential fertility responses of high-
and low-wage women and blue- and white-collar workers, indi-
cating that both cash transfers and job protection have a sizable
impact on fertility and labor market responses. Fifth, we find that
the 1996 reduction of PL duration had a significant effect on the
timing of subsequent births but no impact on the number of chil-
dren. The 1996 partial reversal of the extension granted in 1990
also partially undoes the short-run reductions in employment and
earnings generated by the 1990 extension of PL duration.
This paper contributes to the literature on the impact of cash
transfers on fertility behavior (Hardoy and Schøne 2005; Milligan
2005) and to the literature on the effects of welfare reform on fer-
tility behavior of low-income women in the United States (Hoynes
1997; Moffitt 1998; Rosenzweig 1999; Joyce et al. 2004; Kearney
2004).1 Furthermore, Averett and Whittington (2001) study the
1. Bjo¨rklund (2007) provides a survey of recent empirical work on the impact
of family policies on fertility.
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impact of the Family and Medical Leave Act in 1993 on fertility.
Hoem (1993) studies the impact of PL rules (“speed premium”) for
Sweden, and Piketty (2003) looks at parental education benefits
in France. This paper also contributes to the literature studying
the effects of family leave on labor market outcomes. Klerman
and Leibowitz (1997, 1999) and Baum (2003) find only weak ef-
fects on employment and wages. Berger and Waldfogel (2004) for
the United States, Baker and Milligan (2008) for Canada, and
Ruhm and Teague (1997) and Ruhm (1998) for European coun-
tries find a closer relationship between PL provisions and the labor
market attachment of mothers. Albrecht et al. (1998) show that
PL-induced career interruptions are not associated with a wage
penalty for women in Sweden. Scho¨nberg and Ludsteck (2007)
study the causal effects of successive changes in PL duration on
employment and earnings in Germany.2
Our paper adds to this literature in at least four ways. First,
our empirical analysis provides convincing evidence on the ef-
fects of changing PL duration for the current child by adopting a
quasiexperimental approach. Second, our study also provides ev-
idence on the effect of changing PL duration on the future child.
Understanding these two effects is crucial in PL design. Third,
our results speak to the important issue of how policies that en-
hance the balance between work life and family life affect fertility
behavior. This is different from many previous papers that have
focused on the effect of cash transfers on fertility. Fourth, our em-
pirical analysis allows assessing the effects of changes in PL on
both short- and long-run labor market outcomes for mothers. This
allows addressing the frequently raised concern that generous PL
policies will harm mothers in the long run because extended pe-
riods off work lead to depreciation of human capital and worse
future labor market prospects.3
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses
the institutional setup and develops testable hypotheses as to
how the reform might have affected fertility and labor market
2. Several recent papers study the effects of parental leave or child care on
child development (Baker and Milligan 2008; Dustmann and Scho¨nberg 2008;
Berger, Hill, and Waldfogel 2005; Baker, Gruber, and Milligan 2008). A further
related literature analyzes the impact of financial incentives on fertility and labor
supply using a structural approach. See Moffitt (1984) for an early approach to
this question and Laroque and Salanie´ (2005) for a more recent study of the effects
of financial transfers on fertility and labor supply.
3. In a companion paper, we discuss how the two Austrian reforms affect the
quality of mothers’ first postbirth jobs (Lalive and Zweimu¨ller 2007). The analysis
of the current paper is more comprehensive in providing a detailed assessment of
the overall effects of PL on earnings and employment in all postbirth jobs.
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behavior. Section III discusses the data and presents our empirical
strategy for measuring the effects of PL duration on the current
child and on the future child. Section IV presents the fertility and
labor market effects of the increase in PL duration for the current
child enacted with the 1990 reform. Section V studies the effect of
the 1990 increase in PL duration for the future child. Section VI
analyzes the impact of the 1996 reform, and Section VII concludes
with a discussion of the relevance of our findings.
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
This section provides the institutional background of the Aus-
trian PL system and discusses how two reforms in the 1990s may
affect higher-order fertility and work careers of mothers.
II.A. The Austrian PL System in the 1990s
Working women have access to two types of family policies
in Austria: maternity leave and parental leave. Maternity leave
lasts for sixteen weeks (eight weeks before and eight weeks after
the actual birth) and pays the average wage rate over the last
quarter before the birth.
Before July 1990, PL started after maternity leave ended and
lasted until the child’s first birthday. To become eligible for PL
a mother had to satisfy a work requirement. Women taking up
PL for the first time had to have worked (and paid social security
contributions) for at least 52 weeks during the two years prior
to birth or be eligible for unemployment benefits—again fulfilling
a work requirement of 52 weeks out of the two years prior to
entering unemployment. For mothers with at least one previous
take-up of PL or first-time mothers below the age of twenty years,
the work requirement is reduced to twenty weeks of employment
during the last year prior to birth. Moreover, PL is also renewed
if the mother gives birth within a “grace period” that extends up
to four months after the end of an earlier leave.4
4. The exact legal definition of the length of the grace period is that the
work requirement is also abandoned if a new maternity protection period starts
within a grace period of six weeks after the formal termination of a previous
PL. Because maternity protection starts about eight weeks before the due date,
the rules effectively imply that eligibility for PL is renewed for any new child
expected to be born within fourteen weeks after the end of the previous leave.
Because expected birth dates are not observed in our data, we consider a birth to
be realized within the automatic renewal window if it occurs no later than four
months after the end of the previous PL. Work exemptions for higher-order births
are in place in countries where PL lasts long enough so that women could give
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FIGURE I
PL Benefits and Work Requirement for Higher-Order Births
Figure shows the benefit path for a women earning real 1,000 euros per month
before giving birth to her first child (A) and the number of weeks she needs to work
for parental leave to cover the subsequent child (B). The parental leave benefit is
340 euros per month irrespective of prebirth monthly income. Dotted line refers
to the situation before July 1990, solid line refers to the situation between July
1990 and June 1996, and dashed line refers to the post–July 1996 rules. Source.
Austrian federal laws, various years.
PL provisions are twofold. On the one hand, PL protects the
previous job. A mother has the right to return to her previous
employer until PL ends. Moreover, she cannot be dismissed dur-
ing the first four weeks after returning to work.5 On the other
hand, PL is associated with a government transfer. A mother eli-
gible for PL in 1990 received a PL benefit of about 340 euros per
month (31 percent of gross median female earnings). Benefits are
not means-tested and not taxed, implying a median net income re-
placement ratio of more than 40 percent. Single women (or women
with a low-income partner) are eligible for higher benefit levels
(Sonderunterstu¨tzung).
Figure IA shows the time path of transfer income for a PL-
eligible woman who has earned 1,000 euros per month during the
quarter before birth. Maternity leave transfers amount to 1,000
birth to a new child while being covered by a PL from a previous child. In Germany,
job protection is extended when a mother gives birth to a child within a current
leave. The “speed premium” in Sweden grants higher PL benefits to parents who
have subsequent children within sufficiently short intervals. Also, the PL systems
of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Estonia feature renewal rules that are very
similar to the Austrian system.
5. PL renewal makes mothers eligible for a maternity leave transfer that is
eighty percent higher than the regular PL transfer. The maternity leave transfer
of mothers who work in between two births equals the average wage in the three
months prior to giving birth (the same as for a first birth). PL renewal leaves job
protection unchanged.
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euros for a period of about two months after birth.6 After mater-
nity leave has been exhausted, this mother has two options. One
is to arrange care for her newborn child and return to her prebirth
job earning 1,000 euros per month. This option is complicated by
the fact that the Austrian child care system for children under the
age of three years is rather limited. Alternatively, she can provide
care for her newborn child and take up PL, earning 340 euros
per month until her child turns one year old. On her child’s first
birthday, she can decide to return to her prebirth job, take up a
new job, or continue to provide care for her child. In the event
that she gives birth to a new child before her previous child turns
15.5 months old, she has access to renewed leave (Figure IB). Any
child born after that date will be covered only if the mother has
been working for at least twenty weeks prior to giving birth to the
new child.
In July 1990, a first PL reform increased the maximum dura-
tion of PL to two years and was enacted on July 1, 1990.7 A further
reform in 1996 introduced a change in PL duration by introducing
a one-partner PL maximum of eighteen months. Because Austrian
fathers effectively do not take up PL, the one-partner maximum
removed the last six months of PL that were added in 1990.8
6. Because maternity leave is initiated eight weeks prior to expected date of
birth, the pre- and postbirth durations of maternity leave vary.
7. In December 1989, the PL system was changed from a “maternity” to a
“parental” leave system, allowing for the father to go on PL also. However, this is
of no practical consequence. In 1990 fewer than 1% of fathers took advantage of
that possibility. A second change was that women in farm households and family
businesses, as well as women who did not meet the employment requirements,
became eligible for a transfer equal to 50% of regular PL benefits up until the child’s
second birthday. This is of no importance in the present analysis because we
confine ourselves to behavior of female dependent employees. Furthermore, the
reform made it possible to take part-time PL, either between a child’s first and
second birthday (by both parents at the same time) or between a child’s first and
third birthday (only one parent or both parents alternating).
8. Compared to the U.S. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Austrian
PL rules are very generous. The FMLA grants twelve weeks of unpaid leave to
employees in firms with more than fifty workers. Compared to current OECD
systems, the pre-1990 PL system was of average generosity. The rules were very
similar to those currently in place in Canada (twelve months PL, cash transfer
55 percent of previous earnings), Australia (twelve months PL, unpaid), or the
United Kingdom (eighteen weeks paid maternity leave, thirteen months unpaid
PL). Austrian post-1990 rules are more similar to those currently in place in
continental Europe. The German system grants three years of PL and a generous
cash benefit (100 percent of prior earnings on maternity leave, 67 percent of prior
earnings for the first fourteen months of PL, and a flat transfer thereafter). In
France mothers get three years of PL, 80 percent of prior earning for the first
twelve months, and a flat transfer thereafter. Also, Sweden and Norway offer long
leaves and PL benefits replace a very large fraction of prior income. Interestingly,
the renewal option is not unique to the Austrian system. The Swedish “speed
premium” shares similarities, as PL benefits are extended when an additional
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II.B. Effects on Fertility and Work Careers
Extending PL from one year to two years may affect future
fertility for two different reasons: (i) a longer PL duration for
the current child facilitates access to automatically renewed PL
benefits for a new child; and (ii) a longer PL duration for the
future child reduces directly the cost of this child. Arguably, taking
advantage of PL renewal is difficult when PL leave is short. The
one-year policy forces a mother who wants PL protection for the
future child to conceive a new child quite early after the birth of
the previous child.9 The 1990 reform adds twelve crucial months
to the automatic renewal period. Thus, achieving automatic PL
coverage for a future child is easier under the two-year policy than
under the one-year policy (Figure IB).10 In contrast to the 1990
PL extension, the 1996 PL reduction did not change the biological
feasibility of PL renewal. To become eligible without having to go
back to work, a mother has to give birth to a new child within 21.5
months.
By inducing mothers to give birth to a future child within
the automatic renewal period, the 1990 PL extension is likely to
change the spacing of births. Note, however, that any shock induc-
ing mothers to give birth to planned children earlier may translate
into a long-run increase in the total number of children. As fertil-
ity plans are realized earlier, shocks to partnerships, health, etc.,
that are inducing parents to give up family plans in a one-year
system have weaker effects on fertility in a two-year system.11
child is born within two years after the birth of a previous child. The German
system also grants the possibility of PL renewal with respect to job protection
(but, unlike in the Austrian system, PL benefits do not cease when a parent goes
back to work). The PL systems of the Czech Republic and Slovakia are almost
identical to the Austrian system and have the PL renewal feature.
9. To see this more clearly, consider a woman who gives birth on September
1, 1988. She would be entitled to PL through September 1, 1989. To qualify for PL
renewal, with the eight-week prebirth maternity leave and the six-week post-PL
grace period, she would have to give birth by December 14, 1989. Note that this
requires conceiving a new child by March 1989, no later than 5.5 months after
giving birth to the previous child, implying a space between births of at most 15.5
months.
10. Under the two-year policy, a woman who gives birth on September 1, 1990,
qualifies for PL renewal if a second child is conceived by March 1992, or 18 months
subsequent to giving birth to the previous child.
11. Notice that when this argument is applied to the 1996 PL reduction, it
is not clear whether this reform will lead to more or less children. On the one
hand, the 1996 reform requires a tighter space between births for a mother who
takes advantage of renewal. On the other hand, although the required space is
biologically feasible, it is shorter than before and may induce some mothers to
delay a planned birth. The first effect increases and the last effect decreases the
number of births.
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Extending PL may also affect higher-order fertility because
it lowers the cost of having a future child. Ceteris paribus, a two-
year leave for the future child is more attractive than a one-year
leave. Thus, the 1990 reform is expected to increase the number
of children born to women exposed to the new policy.
The second key aim of PL policies is to facilitate balancing
family work and market work. Changes in the duration of PL for
the current child may affect mothers’ work careers in two ways.
Take-up of extended leaves delays return to work, lowers employ-
ment, and lowers labor earnings in the short run (0–36 months
after the birth of the current child). Moreover, prolonged career
interruptions may also lead to mothers’ postbirth careers deteri-
orating in the long run (37 to 120 months after the birth of the
current child). Changes in PL duration for the future child are ex-
pected to affect short-run postbirth work careers only indirectly,
via their effect on births.
Austrian PL offers two distinct types of benefits: a flat
transfer and job protection. Flat transfers translate into strong
differences in replacement rates. We therefore expect strong het-
erogeneity in the responses to changes of PL in mothers with high
earnings prior to birth and mothers with low prebirth earnings.
Moreover, PL policies target not only costs associated with fore-
gone current income but also costs associated with loss of lifetime
income following a job loss. A longer duration of job protection may
be particularly beneficial for mothers with firm-specific human
capital or mothers who are on deferred payment contracts. To shed
light on this issue, we compare women working in white-collar
occupations to women in blue-collar jobs. Arguably, job-specific
human capital, internal labor market, and career concerns are
more important in white-collar jobs, so the job-protection channel
should trigger stronger responses for white-collar women than for
blue-collar women.
III. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
In this section we first discuss the available data. We then
present the empirical strategies and explain the assumptions un-
der which we identify the causal effect of changes in PL duration
on fertility and labor market outcomes.
III.A. Data
Our empirical analysis is based on the Austrian Social Secu-
rity Database (ASSD). This database collects information relevant
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to old-age social security benefits. As these benefits depend on in-
dividuals’ earnings and employment histories, the database col-
lects information on work histories for the universe of Austrian
private sector employees. Furthermore, the database also contains
information on exact dates of births. A disadvantage of the ASSD
is partial recording of birth histories. ASSD records all births that
occur after a woman’s first job in the private sector. This means
that we can precisely determine the relative parity of any birth
but we cannot determine any birth’s absolute parity.12
Our ASSD extract covers women giving birth to their first
ASSD child in the years 1985, 1987, 1990, 1993, and 1996. We ob-
serve second-child births, return to work, employment, and earn-
ings for these women until the year 2000, allowing us to analyze
about ten years of a woman’s life for the 1990 reform and less than
that for the 1996 reform. We focus on mothers who are likely to be
at parity one because this yields a comprehensive picture of how
changes in PL on this first child affect future fertility and work
careers.13
We establish PL eligibility for these women by considering
work careers two years prior to their giving birth to the first
child. Note that measuring eligibility is complicated because a
woman’s work career in the public sector is unobserved (but counts
for PL eligibility) and because a woman’s parity is unobserved.
Our eligibility indicator allocates a woman into the PL-eligible
group if she demonstrates any employment or has ever been eli-
gible for unemployment benefits in the two years prior to giving
birth. Clearly, this definition of eligibility may give rise to mis-
classifying ineligible women into the eligible group, thus reducing
take-up. More importantly, this encompassing definition of eligi-
bility allows identification of a group of ineligible women (who
neither worked nor received unemployment benefits in the two
12. Partial recording of previous births implies that we cannot precisely de-
termine the parity of a birth. To make things precise, assume a working woman
gives birth to a child at age thirty. If this woman is continuously employed in the
private sector, we know this birth is her first birth and all subsequent births are
recorded in the ASSD. However, if this woman entered the ASSD, say, at age 25
(e.g., because she was previously employed in the public sector and not covered by
the ASSD), she could have could have given birth to children before entering the
ASSD. More generally, if we observe x previous births in the data, we know that
any subsequent birth is of parity x or higher.
13. Our focus here is on mothers, even though fathers could in principle take
up PL provisions too. There are two reasons that we do not include fathers in our
analysis. First, take-up by fathers is extremely low. Second, our database does not
provide information on the dates of birth of a father’s children. Hence, fathers’
reactions to PL policies cannot be addressed in the present context.
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years before giving birth) who do not go on to collect PL in our
data. This finding makes us confident that we cleanly identify the
group of PL-ineligible women—a group that is of importance in
discussing the validity of the empirical strategy measuring the
effect of changing PL duration for the future child. Furthermore,
in line with demographic research, we restrict attention to women
aged 15 to 45 years when giving birth to their first ASSD children.
The ASSD allows constructing a set of four key outcome mea-
sures. Information on the date of birth of the second ASSD child
allows measuring whether a mother gives birth to at least one
additional child. Information on the date of return to work allows
discussing return-to-work decisions. Information on the woman’s
work and earnings career allows assessing employment and earn-
ings in the two years prior to giving birth and up to ten years
after birth. In the analysis below, we measure employment and
earnings at a yearly frequency relative to the birthday of the first
child. The set of conditioning variables comprises information on
employment, unemployment, and earnings since entry into ASSD
(either 1972 or time of entry into the labor market) and on a
woman’s labor market position exactly one year prior to birth
(employed or unemployed, industry and region of employer, daily
labor income white-collar or blue-collar occupation).14
III.B. Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy uses the 1990 and 1996 PL reforms
to identify the effect of PL duration for the current child and the
effect of PL duration for the future child.
Table IA shows PL durations for the current and the future
child for three cohorts of women who gave birth to a first child at
three different dates: July 1990, June 1990, and June 1987.15 July
1990 mothers are eligible for 24 months of PL for the current child
and PL renewal takes place when a future child is born within 27.5
months after the July 1990 birth. PL duration is 24 months for any
child born within three years. June 1990 mothers are eligible for
12 months of PL for the current child and PL renewal is possible
when a future child is born within 15.5 months. PL duration is 24
months for any child born within three years. June 1987 mothers
are eligible for 12 months of PL for the current child and any
14. The data do not have information on hours, education, or marital status.
15. Table IB displays the analogous cohorts for the 1996 reform.
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TABLE I
EMPIRICAL DESIGN
Parental leave
Parental leave Automatic future child
Current child born current child renewal (born within 36 months)
(A) 1990 reform
June 1987 12 months 15.5 months 12 months
June 1990 12 months 15.5 months 24 months
July 1990 24 months 27.5 months 24 months
(B) 1996 reform
June 1993 24 months 27.5 months 24 months
June 1996 24 months 27.5 months 18 months
July 1996 18 months 21.5 months 18 months
Source: Austrian Federal Laws, various years.
future child born within 36 months. PL is automatically renewed
if the future child is born within 15.5 months.
Identifying the Current-Child PL Effect. Can the current-
child PL effect be identified from a comparison of June 1990
mothers with July 1990 mothers? These two groups differ in the
duration of the PL renewal period (and the associated PL dura-
tion for the first child), but they have the same PL duration for
a future child. The crucial identification issue is to what extent
mothers could have influenced the date of birth of the current
child in anticipation of the policy change. There are at least two
reasons that lead us to believe that mothers cannot have “timed”
births. First, the conception of a child is an event that cannot
be perfectly planned by parents. Second, even if parents could
deterministically plan a birth, self-selection requires that par-
ents have been informed of the July 1990 policy reform at the
date of conception. We performed a content analysis of the ma-
jor Austrian newspapers to check the information that potential
parents had nine months before the June/July 1990 births, that
is, in September/October 1989. The public discussion about the
PL reform started in November 11, 1989, but the ruling coalition
(social democrats and conservatives) discussed it until April 5,
1990, until it had designed a policy reform apt to find parliamen-
tary approval. Because it was not clear until three months prior
to the policy change whether a PL reform would take place and
how it would be implemented, the June/July 1990 births were not
influenced by anticipation of the July 1990 PL reform. However,
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although anticipation of the PL reform at the date of conception
is unlikely, it is still possible that mothers could have influenced
the timing of a birth by postponing induced births or planned cae-
sarean sections.16 We assess the presence of such fine tuning in
two ways. First, analyzing the number of children born in June
and July 1990, we do not find evidence of a spike in births on July
1, 1990. Second, because birth timing is likely to be strongest right
around the reform date, we assess the sensitivity of our results
by excluding births occurring one week before and one week after
July 1, 1990.17
Because babies’ dates of birth assign extended PL and parents
could not anticipate extended leave, we can identify the current-
child PL effect by comparing treated mothers giving birth (to the
current child) in July 1990 to control mothers giving birth in June
1990.18 Although treatment and control samples are selected over
two successive months, we consider their fertility and labor mar-
ket outcomes over the following 36 months (short-run effects) and
the following 120 months (long-run effects). Differences between
treated and control mothers cannot be attributed to differences
in the environment. In fact, the treated and control mothers are
facing different parental leave incentives but practically identical
economic conditions following the June/July 1990 birth.
Identifying the Future-Child PL Effect. To identify the effect
of PL duration on the future child, we compare short-run (0–36
months after birth) and medium-run (37–72 months after birth)
outcomes of June 1987 to June 1990 mothers. Identification of the
16. Gans and Leigh (2006) show that the introduction of the Australian baby
bonus on July 1, 2004, led to a significant increase in the number of births on
that same day, suggesting that parents postponed their births to ensure they were
eligible for the bonus. Similarly, Dickert-Conlin and Chandra (1999) show that
the U.S. tax system creates an incentive to give birth to a child on the 31st of
December rather than on the 1st of January. They find that the probability that a
child is born in the last week of December, rather than the first week of January,
is positively correlated with tax benefits.
17. Mothers could also have changed prebirth work patterns in order to be-
come eligible for extended leave. Empirical evidence on prebirth employment in
Figure VC is not consistent with such qualification effects.
18. This is essentially a regression discontinuity framework (RDD). Denote
the treatment status of a mother by D, where D = 1 if a mother has access to a
two-year leave, and D = 0 if a mother has access to a one-year leave. Eligibility for
treatment is a discontinuous function of the current child’s date of birth T . Denote
by t the date when policy changes (July 1, 1990, for the change from the 12-month
to the 24-month policy and July 1, 1996, for the change from the 24-month to
the 18-month policy). Provided that lim→0 Pr(D = 1|T = t + ) = lim→0 Pr(D =
0|T = t − ), our design satisfies the “fuzzy” RDD assumption (Hahn, Todd, and
Klaauw 2001). Figure II is consistent with this assumption being strongly satisfied.
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future-child PL effect requires stronger assumptions than those
needed to identify the current-child PL effect. The central identi-
fying assumption is that there are no substantial cohort or time
effects that pollute the comparison between June 1987 and June
1990. We propose three ways of assessing the plausibility of this
assumption. First, we analyze PL-ineligible women as a control
group and check whether outcomes for June 1990 mothers follow
a different trend than outcomes for June 1987 mothers, finding no
significant time trend. Clearly, this small control group is less than
perfect because it encompasses women with weak prebirth labor
market attachment. Second, we study time and cohort trends for
PL-eligible mothers both before and after the 1990 reform. Third,
we also exploit the way PL rules change with time since first
birth. Although differences in PL rules between the treated and
the control group exist during the first 36 months, the same rules
apply 37–72 months after birth. Thus, treated and control moth-
ers should differ in the period 0–36 months after birth but less so
in the period 37–72 months after birth.
Finally, adding up the effect of extending current leave with
the effect of extending future leave allows estimating the total
effect of PL duration and PL renewal. Arguably, this total effect
comes close to the effects generated by moving fully from a one-
year to a two-year system—an effect of prime policy interest.
IV. EXTENDING PL DURATION FOR THE CURRENT CHILD
This section discusses the effects of extending PL duration
for the current child on fertility and return-to-work behavior. The
analysis proceeds in three steps. We first document the fertility
effects of changing PL duration for the current child. Next, we turn
to labor market responses. And finally, we assess the potential
heterogeneity in the responses to the reform by groups that differ
in income and in broad occupation
IV.A. The Impact on Fertility
The ASSD reports information on PL take-up. Focusing on
PL eligible mothers of newborn children, Figure II reports av-
erage PL take-up (including zeros) associated with a first child
born between June 1 and July 30, 1990. June 1990 mothers are
eligible for ten months of the parental leave (excluding the first
two months of maternity leave). Results indicate that of these ten
months, June 1990 mothers take up on average nine months of PL.
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FIGURE II
Parental Leave Taken with Current Child
June smoothed backward, July smoothed forward (15-day moving average).
Source. ASSD, own calculations. Sample restricted to PL-eligible women giving
birth to a child in June 1–30 or July 1–30 of 1990.
In contrast, average PL take-up by July 1990 mothers amounts to
19 months, which is considerably more than for any mother giving
birth in June 1990. Interestingly, average PL take-up is about 85
percent of the 22 months covered by PL after the 1990 reform (af-
ter two months of maternity leave). This suggests that the second
year of leave is valued by the majority of eligible women.
Figure II suggests comparing treated mothers who give birth
in July 1990 to control mothers who give birth in June 1990.
How informative is this contrast on the causal effect of extending
PL duration for the current child? Table II provides descriptive
evidence on PL take-up by years since birth as well as on key
prebirth characteristics. Treated and control mothers are identical
with respect to PL take-up in the first year after giving birth
to their current child. Both cohorts take up about 9.2 months
out of the roughly 10 months offered by the PL system. Striking
differences in PL take-up appear in the second year after birth.
Whereas treated mothers spend about ten months on PL, control
mothers spend less than one month on PL (with their second
child).
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TABLE II
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, MOTHERS GIVING BIRTH IN JUNE AND JULY 1990
July 1990 June 1990 Contrast
Mean SD Mean SD Est SE
(A) Treatment
Parental leave,
yr 1 (mths)
9.208 (2.194) 9.196 (2.139) 0.012 (0.055)
Parental leave,
yr 2 (mths)
10.082 (3.486) 0.795 (2.209) 9.287 (0.074)∗∗∗
(B) Demographics
Age 20–24 0.423 (0.494) 0.443 (0.497) −0.02 (0.013)
Age 25–29 0.346 (0.476) 0.343 (0.475) 0.004 (0.012)
Age 30–34 0.109 (0.311) 0.087 (0.282) 0.022 (0.008)∗∗∗
Age 35–44 0.029 (0.167) 0.025 (0.156) 0.004 (0.004)
(C) Labor market history
Employment (years) 5.846 (3.94) 5.701 (3.792) 0.144 (0.098)
Unemployment (years) 0.265 (0.543) 0.257 (0.484) 0.008 (0.013)
Earnings not observed?
(1 = yes)
0.028 (0.165) 0.026 (0.16) 0.002 (0.004)
Daily earnings (euros) 34.49 (42.942) 33.313 (37.719) 1.178 (1.026)
(D) One year before birth
Employed (1 = yes) 0.868 (0.339) 0.867 (0.339) 0.001 (0.009)
White collar (1 = yes) 0.435 (0.496) 0.441 (0.497) −0.006 (0.013)
Daily 1989 earnings
(euros)
36.826 (20.935) 36.142 (20.397) 0.684 (0.526)
Observations 3,225 2,955
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample restricted to PL-eligible women giving birth to a child in June
1–30 or July 1–30 of year 1990.
Notes: Mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) for women giving birth to their first child in June
1–30 or July 1–30, 1990. Labor market history covers the period from January 1972 to date of birth in June
or July 1990. Labor earnings are unobserved for women coming from the public sector, which is not covered
by ASSD. Daily earnings refer to real mean earnings measured in year 2000 euros per day worked—real total
labor earnings divided by work experience. Daily 1989 earnings are earnings on the prebirth job measured in
year 2000 euros—the job held exactly one year before giving birth. Data also contain information on region
and industry of the prebirth employer.
In contrast to PL take-up, both cohorts appear to be quite
similar with respect to prebirth characteristics. Both groups show
similar amounts of previous work and unemployment experience
and previous average labor earnings. Also, labor market status
one year before the 1990 birth differs only slightly. Although July
1990 mothers are significantly more likely to be in the age bracket
30–34 years than June 1990 mothers, the overall age composition
is quite comparable. Almost 80 percent of all births occur in the
age group 20–29 and about 13 percent at ages thirty and older.
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FIGURE III
How Does Parental Leave Affect Higher-Order Fertility?
Figure reports the percentage of women who gave birth to at least one ad-
ditional child within three years after giving birth in June or July 1990. June
smoothed backward, July smoothed forward (15-day moving average). Source.
ASSD, own calculations. Sample restricted to PL-eligible women giving birth to a
child in June 1–30 or July 1–30 of 1990.
Table II also indicates that there are substantially more
births in July 1990 than in June 1990. Is this evidence for birth
timing? We investigate this issue by analyzing the number of
births in June and July 1990 on a day-to-day basis, finding a
steady increase but no discontinuity in the number of births on
July 1 (not reported). Thus, comparing June 1990 mothers to
July 1990 mothers, we find little evidence of seasonality in the
composition of cohorts but strong seasonality in the number of
births.19
Figure III presents first evidence on the causal effect of ex-
tending PL for the current child on the decision to have an addi-
tional child. The vertical axis measures the percentage of women
who gave birth to a second child within the 36 months following
19. Indeed, births in July exceed births in June in any given year of our sample
period (1985, 1987, 1990, 1993, 1996). Nevertheless, we perform sensitivity tests
comparing births that occur, respectively, in the first/second half of June 1990 and
the first/second half of July 1990 to assess the sensitivity of our results to short-run
timing of births.
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the 1990 birth. To smooth out the noise in date-of-birth data,
Figure III presents fifteen-day backward moving averages for
June and fifteen-day forward moving averages for July. Results
indicate that 32.2 of 100 women in the control group give birth
to an additional child within the 36 months. In contrast, almost
36.7 of 100 women do so in the treated group. Thus, almost 5 of
100 women tend to give birth to an additional child in the treated
cohort who do not do so in the control group. The magnitude of
this effect seems quite robust and varies only slightly over the
particular time window one adopts.
Table III discusses the validity of this result, explaining the
probability of giving birth to an additional child within three years
in the context of a linear probability model. Column (1) estimates
a baseline difference in short-run higher-order fertility of about
4.5 additional births per hundred mothers. Column (2) includes
information on age and prebirth labor market history to assess
the sensitivity of the key result to composition of treated and con-
trol group mothers. Results indicate that extended PL increases
short-run fertility by 4.9 additional children per hundred women.
Moreover, estimates indicate that higher-order fertility is lower
for older women and for employed women. Column (3) estimates
the causal effect of extended leave on births by reducing the width
of the baseline window from thirty to fifteen days. Results suggest
that about 5.4 children are born to one hundred women with ex-
tended leave that are not present under short leave. Anticipating
extension of leave, mothers with a strong desire to have two or
more children might have timed the birth of their first child to take
place on or after July 1, 1990 (by postponing a planned caesarean
section or delayed induction of a birth to July 1 or later). Column
(4) excludes births taking place one week before and one week
after July 1, 1990. Excluding these observations leaves results es-
sentially unchanged; point estimates even slightly increase. The
last column of Table III runs a placebo regression where we repeat
the regression of column (2) using data on mothers giving birth to
their first ASSD child in June and July 1987. These two groups
faced identical PL rules and hence we should not see any major
differences between them. In fact, the estimated treatment effect
is insignificant and the point estimate very close to zero.
The empirical analysis has documented a short-run response
of higher-order fertility. Does this short-run response persist in
the long run? Contrasting June and July 1990 mothers, Figure IV
shows how extended leave for the first child affected higher-order
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TABLE III
THE THREE-YEAR FERTILITY EFFECT OF EXTENDING PL DURATION FOR THE CURRENT
CHILD, JULY 1990 (24 MONTHS PL) VS JUNE 1990 (12 MONTHS PL)
Base Controls Half-window Anticipation Placebo
July .045 .049 .054 .056 .008
(.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.011)
Age 20–24 .045 .035 .042 .012
(.024)∗ (.034) (.027) (.021)
Age 25–29 .029 .014 .028 .048
(.028) (.039) (.031) (.025)∗
Age 30–34 −.059 −.073 −.058 .020
(.033)∗ (.046) (.037) (.033)
Age 35–44 −.111 −.116 −.099 −.125
(.043)∗∗∗ (.062)∗ (.049)∗∗ (.034)∗∗∗
Employment .006 .003 .006 .008
(years) (.006) (.009) (.007) (.007)
Employment sq. −.057 −.048 −.052 −.104
(.038) (.054) (.044) (.046)∗∗
Unemployment .011 .028 .011 −.020
(years) (.022) (.034) (.025) (.028)
Unemployment sq. −1.793 −1.850 −1.783 1.065
(.694)∗∗∗ (1.202) (.752)∗∗ (1.233)
Earnings −.025 −.038 −.004 .062
unobserved (.045) (.060) (.051) (.046)
Daily earnings .000 −.000 .000 .001
(euros) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)∗∗
Daily earnings sq. −.000 .000 −.000 −.000
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)∗∗∗
Employed −.111 −.036 −.121 −.099
(.050)∗∗ (.075) (.057)∗∗ (.045)∗∗
White collar −.011 −.031 −.004 −.005
(.017) (.024) (.020) (.016)
Daily 1989 .002 .001 .002 .002
earnings (.002) (.003) (.002) (.002)
Daily 1989 −.000 .000 .000 −.001
earnings sq. (.002) (.003) (.002) (.002)
Industry No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent
variable
0.345 0.345 0.346 0.345 0.258
N 6,180 6,180 3,045 4,757 6,151
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample covers PL-eligible women giving birth to their first child in June
1–30 or July 1–30 of the respective years.
Notes: Linear model of the probability of giving birth to a second child within three years of giving birth
to a first child in June/July 1990. Standard error in parentheses. ∗(∗∗ ,∗∗∗) denote significance at the 10% (5%,
1%) level, respectively. Inference based on Huber–White standard errors. “Base”: July (24 months PL) vs June
(12 months PL). Controls: adds controls (Table II). Half-window: June 16–July 15. Anticipation: June 1–23
and July 8–30. Placebo: June 1987 (12 months PL) vs July 1987 (12 months PL).
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FIGURE IV
Additional Births (“Hazard” and Cumulative Proportion), July 1990 (24 Months
PL) vs. June 1990 (12 Months PL)
Figure reports the additional child hazard, that is, the women giving birth to
an additional child in month t as a proportion of those who have not given birth
to an additional child up to month t (A), and the cumulative proportion of women
giving birth to at least one additional child up to month t (B). Vertical bars indicate
end of automatic renewal (dashed for June 1990 mothers, regular for July 1990
mothers). Source. ASSD, own calculations. Sample restricted to PL-eligible women
giving birth to a child in June 1–30 or July 1–30 of 1990.
fertility within the ten years following the 1990 birth. Figure IVA
shows the second-child hazard rate, that is, the likelihood that a
woman gives birth to a second child t months after the 1990 birth
conditional on not giving birth to a second child before month t.
The control group has a somewhat higher second-child hazard rate
between months 12 and 16, whereas the treated group has a much
higher hazard between month 18 and month 28. The difference
between the two groups is largest during months 22–25, when
the additional birth hazard is almost 3.5% for the treated group
but less than 2% for the control group. After month 28 there are
no major differences between the two groups. This pattern can be
rationalized by the PL rules. Recall that the rules grant renewal
of PL to control group mothers giving birth before month 16 and to
treated mothers giving birth before month 28. Figure IVA shows
that the additional-child hazard diverges most strongly when PL
renewal is possible to treated mothers but impossible to control
mothers.
Figure IVB shows the cumulative proportion of women with
a second child by time since the 1990 birth. Results indicate that
the treated have a lower second-child probability before month 22
but a higher one thereafter. Interestingly, the difference does not
erode in the long run. Even ten years after the 1990 birth, the
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TABLE IV
SHORT-RUN AND LONG-RUN FERTILITY EFFECTS OF PL DURATION FOR THE CURRENT
CHILD, JULY 1990 (24 MONTHS PL) VS JUNE 1990 (12 MONTHS PL)
Base Controls Half-window Anticipation Placebo
Additional birth .045 .049 .054 .056 .008
0–36 months (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.011)
[.345] [.345] [.346] [.345] [.258]
Additional birth .03 .035 .03 .048 −.006
0–120 months (.012)∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.017)∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.012)
[.617] [.617] [.62] [.617] [.556]
Additional birth −.027 −.026 −.029 −.023 −.006
0–16 months (.006)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.007)∗∗∗ (.006)
[.066] [.066] [.067] [.066] [.069]
Additional birth .082 .084 .084 .09 .011
17–28 months (.01)∗∗∗ (.01)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.008)
[.193] [.193] [.195] [.194] [.123]
Additional birth −.024 −.021 −.023 −.018 −.011
29–120 months (.012)∗ (.012)∗ (.017) (.014) (.012)
[.36] [.36] [.359] [.359] [.366]
Observations 6,180 6,180 3,045 4,757 6,151
Source. ASSD, own calculations. Sample: PL eligible women giving birth to their first child in June 1–30
(12 months PL) or July 1–30 (24 months PL) in the year 1990.
Notes. This table reports the “July 1990” parameter estimate in a linear probability model comparing
postbirth fertility of mothers giving birth to their first child in June/July 1990. Standard error in parentheses;
mean of dependent variable in brackets. ∗ (∗∗ ,∗∗∗) denote significance at the 10% (5%,1%) level, respectively.
Inference based on Huber–White standard errors. Base: July (24 months PL) vs. June (12 months PL).
Controls: adds controls (Table II). Half-window: June 16–July 15. Anticipation: June 1–23 and July 8–30.
Placebo: June 1–23, 1987 (12 months PL) vs. July 8–30, 1987 (12 months PL).
second-child probability of July 1990 mothers is still three per-
centage points higher than for June 1990 mothers. This suggests
that the increase in fertility created by the PL renewal effect af-
fects not just the timing but also the total number of children.20
Table IV provides an econometric assessment of both short-
run and long-run fertility effects using a linear probability model.
The first row repeats the results of Table III on short-run fertil-
ity. The second row shows the corresponding result for long-run
fertility (birth of a second child within 120 months). Column (1)
shows that the effect of extending PL for the child born in 1990
20. Note that June 1990 mothers might still catch up to July 1990 mothers af-
ter ten years or due to differential third-child fertility. Although our data provide a
window that is, arguably, too short to provide a definitive assessment of completed
fertility, we believe that this is unlikely to happen. First, June and July 1990 moth-
ers face identical economic and political circumstances on the third child. Second,
because only about 65 percent of mothers give birth to two or more children, the
third-child treatment effect would have to reach an implausibly large magnitude.
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leads to three additional children being born to one hundred moth-
ers within ten years. Adding controls (column (2)) increases the
treatment effect to 3.5 percentage points; halving the estimation
window and excluding births closer than seven days before and
after July 1, 1990, does not reverse the result. We conclude that
extending PL for the current child increases long-run fertility.21
Rows (3)–(5) in Table IV document the timing of excess fer-
tility. Column (1) in Table IV shows that treated mothers reduce
future-child fertility by 2.6 percentage points in the period when
both treated mothers and control mothers have access to auto-
matic renewal, that is, between months 0 and 16 (row (3)). Then
there is a strong increase in fertility by 8.4 percentage points in
the period when only treated mothers have access to automatic
renewal, that is, months 17–28 (row (4)). Finally, treated moth-
ers are slightly less likely to give birth to a second child between
month 29 and month 120 (row (5)). This is the period when nei-
ther group has access to automatic renewal. In sum, our results
suggest that the short-run change in access to automatic renewal
leads to long-run effects on higher-order fertility.
The most likely explanation for the high persistence of fertil-
ity effects is shocks (to health, partnership, workplace, etc.) that
may otherwise induce parents to revise their long-run plans. We
show that more generous PL induces parents to realize a planned
birth earlier. This means that some shocks that are inducing par-
ents to change family plans in a one-year system no longer affect
family planning under a two-year system. This is why short-term
gains in fertility also persist in the long run.22
IV.B. Labor Market Outcomes
PL rules address the problems of parents in reconciling work
and child care. Hence these rules also affect parents’ labor market
outcomes. We now explore whether and to what extent extending
21. Although the effect estimated here seems large, our estimated short-run
impact is similar in magnitude to that found by Milligan (2005) for pronatalist
transfer policies in Quebec where, depending on the parity, parents got a cash
transfer up to 8000 CAD. Fertility of those eligible is estimated to have increased
12% on average and 25% for those eligible for the maximum benefit.
22. Although it is true that some women are induced to have a birth within
28 months who would have waited and then never conceived (for preference or
biological reasons), there also appear to be some women who are induced to wait
beyond 16 months. To the extent that these women experience a negative shock,
the net positive effects on the other set of women will be offset. Because there is a
positive net fertility effect, the data suggest that any offsetting of this kind is not
complete.
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leave from one year to two years affects women’s labor market
outcomes, by focusing on three different indicators. (i) Return to
work measures the probability that a woman has returned to work
at least once after giving birth to her first child in June or July
1990 in the short run (0–36 months after birth) and in the long run
(0–120 months after birth). (ii) Employment refers to the months
worked per calendar year after birth in the short run (0–36 months
after birth) and in the long run (37–120 months after birth). (iii)
Earnings measures average pay earned per calendar day after
birth in the short run (0–36 months after birth) and in the long
run (37–120 months after birth). Note that both employment and
earnings are set to zero in periods where a woman does not work
and are included in the empirical analysis.23
Figure VA compares the proportion of women returning to
work within 36 months after a birth in June and July 1990 by day
of birth. Whereas about 62 of 100 women return to work three
years after giving birth in June 1990, only about 52 of 100 women
do so after giving birth in July 1990, with a strong discontinuity
from June 30 to July 1. This suggests a very strong causal impact
of PL duration on short-run return-to-work behavior.
Figure VB compares the return-to-work profile during the
120 months following the 1990 birth. The figure clearly shows
that the maximum length of PL has an extremely strong impact
on return-to-work behavior. About 10% of mothers return to work
within two months after giving birth (i.e., the end of maternity
protection), the same for July 1990 and June 1990 mothers. About
80% of the treated and 83% of the control mothers exhaust the full
PL duration. Although a substantial fraction of both treated (20%)
and control mothers (25%) return to work exactly when PL has run
out, the majority of women (60% among the treated, 58% among
controls) stay home after PL has lapsed. Moreover, extended leave
for the 1990 child seems to lower the fraction ever returning to
work. Whereas 85 of 100 women return to work at least once
ten years after the 1990 birth, only 82 of 100 treated women
do so.
23. Return to work at date t measures the probability that a woman has
stopped her baby break between date 0 and date t. In contrast, employment counts
the days at work between date 0 and date t (set to zero when a woman does
not work). Because a woman could have returned to work at some date s < t but
dropped out of workforce at some later date τ ∈ (s, t), the two indicators differ.
Unconditional labor earnings are average earnings per month and set to zero
when a woman does not work at all during the respective month. Employment
and earnings are available at an annual frequency.
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FIGURE V
Return to Work, Employment, and Labor Earnings, June 1990 vs. July 1990
Panel A reports the percentage of women who have returned to work at least
once within three years after the 1990 birth (June smoothed backward, July
smoothed forward, fifteen-day moving average); Panel B reports the cumulative
proportion of women who have returned to work at least once since the 1990 birth;
Panel C reports average months in employment; and Panel D reports mean labor
earnings per calendar day since the 1990 birth. (Panels C and D are drawn on
an annual frequency; data points at six, eighteen, etc., months refer to the first,
second, etc. year after the 1990 birth.) Employment and earnings are set to zero
for women who do not hold a job. Zeros are included in all our analyses. Source.
ASSD, own calculations. Sample restricted to PL-eligible women giving birth to a
child in June 1–30 or July 1–30 of year 1990.
Figure VC explores the effects of extended leave on employ-
ment. Employment patterns of women giving birth to their first
child are strikingly asymmetric. Whereas paid work takes up
about nine to ten months per prebirth year, time spent in the
workplace is below seven months in all postbirth years. Interest-
ingly, adverse PL effects on return to work do not translate into
lower employment rates. Whereas there is a clear short-run em-
ployment disadvantage of treated mothers compared to control
mothers in the second year after the 1990 birth, employment is
basically the same from the third year onward. Return-to-work
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patterns can be reconciled with employment results as follows.
Women eligible for short parental leaves who are planning a fur-
ther child return to work in the short run temporarily to gain
access to renewed parental leave. In contrast, women eligible
for long parental leaves can exploit the renewal option and do
not have to return. This behavioral pattern explains simultane-
ously the fact that the fraction ever returning to work is lower
in the treated group but long-run employment in months 37–120
remains unchanged. Basically, extending parental leave reduces
short-run temporary return to work but does not affect longer-run
labor supply decisions.
Figure VD displays the evolution of average labor earnings
for the two groups. Again, earnings patterns are strikingly asym-
metric in periods covering a first-child birth. Whereas women earn
about 33 euros per calendar day before birth, mothers of newborn
children earn less than 30 euros in all ten postbirth years. In terms
of assessing the effects of extended PL on earnings, Figure VD
shows that prebirth average earnings are identical between June
and July 1990 mothers but diverge strongly immediately after
they give birth. Earnings are lower for treated women in the first
three years after the 1990 birth. From year four onward, however,
treated mothers earn slightly more than control mothers. The
positive medium-run earnings effect of extended leave could be
driven by various channels: participation in work, length of work,
selection into work, and a genuine behavioral effect (more hours,
better jobs due to promotions, etc.). Long-run employment results
(months 37–120) suggest that the joint effects of participation and
length of work are close to zero. There is also a small but insignifi-
cant composition effect: women with high prebirth wages return to
the job earlier with extended leave than with short parental leave.
This implies that the somewhat higher long-run earnings of July
1990 mothers are due to a genuine behavioral effect. Although
this effect is small, it seems that those mothers who return af-
ter extended leaves work somewhat more and/or are employed in
relatively better paid jobs than mothers who return after shorter
leaves.
Table V uses linear regression to assess the causal effects
of the 1990 PL extension for the current child on short- and
long-run labor market outcomes. Columns (1)–(5) assess the
sensitivity of the results in the same way as the corresponding
columns in Table IV on short-run fertility. Treated mothers are
significantly less likely to have returned to work three years
PARENTAL LEAVE, FERTILITY, AND RETURN TO WORK 1389
TABLE V
LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF PL DURATION FOR THE CURRENT CHILD, JULY 1990
(24 MONTHS PL) VS. JUNE 1990 (12 MONTHS PL)
Base Controls Half-window Anticipation Placebo
Return to work −.109 −.11 −.109 −.105 .009
0–36 months (.013)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.012)
[.564] [.564] [.567] [.561] [.619]
Return to work −.03 −.027 −.046 −.023 .009
0–120 months (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗ (.01)∗∗ (.009)
[.847] [.847] [.85] [.845] [.83]
Employment −.999 −1.02 −1.001 −1.031 −.051
0–36 months (.073)∗∗∗ (.071)∗∗∗ (.1)∗∗∗ (.081)∗∗∗ (.083)
[2.185] [2.185] [2.194] [2.183] [2.908]
Employment .07 .074 .047 .09 −.09
37–120 months (.111) (.109) (.155) (.124) (.111)
[5.136] [5.136] [5.202] [5.107] [4.889]
Earnings −2.739 −2.998 −3.156 −3.044 −.821
0–36 months (.335)∗∗∗ (.304)∗∗∗ (.429)∗∗∗ (.348)∗∗∗ (.321)∗∗
[10.159] [10.159] [10.223] [10.096] [12.155]
Earnings .852 .545 .195 .522 −.862
37–120 months (.563) (.522) (.74) (.598) (.518)∗
[20.759] [20.759] [21.014] [20.658] [19.39]
Observations 6,180 6,180 3,045 4,757 6,150
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample: PL-eligible women giving birth to their first child in June 1–30
(12 months PL) or July 1–30 (24 months PL) in the year 1990.
Notes: This table reports the July 1990 parameter estimate in a linear regression/linear probability model
comparing postbirth labor market outcomes of mothers giving birth to their first child in June and July 1990.
Standard error in parentheses; mean of dependent variable in brackets. Employment and earnings are set to
zero for women who do not hold a job. Zeros are included in all our analyses. ∗ (∗∗ ,∗∗∗) denote significance at
the 10% (5%,1%) level respectively. Inference based on Huber–White standard errors. Base: July (24 months
PL) vs. June (12 months PL). Controls: adds controls (Table II). Half-window: June 16–July 15. Anticipation:
June 1–23 and July 8–30. Placebo: June 1987 (12 months PL) vs. July 1987 (12 months PL).
after giving birth to their first in July 1990 (row (1)) and the
difference is quantitatively large: An additional 10 of 100 mothers
have not returned to work within three years after the 1990
birth. This difference in return to work shrinks over time but a
significant three-percentage point difference still remains even
after ten years (row (2)). Interestingly, although treated mothers
work about one month per year less during the first three years
after giving birth (row (3)), there are no long-run employment
differences between treated and controls. During months 37–120
after birth, average employment is the same for the two groups
(row (4)). A similar finding obtains for earnings per calendar
month. Treated mothers earn about three euros less from working
on the average day of the three first postbirth years (row (5));
1390 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
there is even a positive albeit statistically insignificant earnings
differential between treated and control mothers four to ten
years after giving birth (months 37–120, row (6)). Thus, although
the 1990 reform slightly reduced the number of women ever
returning to work, staying out of work for an extended period does
not appear to harm employment and earnings of treated mothers.
IV.C. Heterogeneous Responses: Income and Occupation
Austrian PL provisions offer job protection and a financial
transfer during the time a mother stays off work. Although both
types of policies reduce the costs of having children, they target
quite different dimensions of these costs. Cash transfers help ex-
tend the time a mother can stay home with her baby without run-
ning into financial distress. This is more likely to help low-income
parents. In contrast, job protection extends the time a mother can
spend with her baby without losing her job. This is more likely to
help career-oriented women, for whom job loss may be very costly.
Table VI explores whether extending PL duration affects
high- and low-wage women differently. A mother is considered
“Hi Wage” if daily earnings on the job held exactly one year prior
to giving birth (prebirth job) exceeds the median of daily prebirth
earnings (37.12 euros per day worked); and a mother is considered
“Lo Wage” otherwise. The flat rate transfer of 340 euros translates
into a low replacement rate for high-wage women and a high re-
placement rate for low-wage women. Moreover, taking occupation
as a proxy for the extent of job-specific skills, we also investigate
whether the responses for women holding a white-collar occupa-
tion one year prior to birth (column (4)) were different from the
responses of women holding a blue-collar job (column (5)).24 For
comparison purposes, column (1) repeats the baseline result (col-
umn (1) of Tables IV and V).25
Results indicate that the 1990 PL reform led to a significant
increase in short-run fertility for both high- and low-wage women
(Table VI, columns (2) and (3)). Excess short-run fertility amounts
24. Women who did not hold a job one year prior to giving birth to the 1990
child are allocated to the low-wage/blue-collar categories. Results remain qualita-
tively unchanged if we exclude nonemployed women.
25. Clearly, such rough sample splits along one dimension are likely to be
contaminated by imbalance along other dimensions. For instance, 62% of high-
wage women hold a white-collar occupation, whereas only 44% of all women hold
a white-collar occupation. Nevertheless, splitting the sample along these two di-
mensions allows discussing the relevance of earnings replacement and value of job
protection.
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TABLE VI
HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS OF PL DURATION FOR THE CURRENT CHILD (1990 REFORM)
All Hi wage Lo wage Wt col Bl col
(A) Fertility
Additional birth .049 .036 .068 .055 .048
0–36 months (.012)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.016)∗∗∗
[.345] [.351] [.339] [.349] [.342]
Additional birth .035 .016 .054 .034 .036
0–120 months (.012)∗∗∗ (.017) (.017)∗∗∗ (.018)∗ (.016)∗∗
[.617] [.616] [.618] [.611] [.622]
Additional birth −.026 −.033 −.018 −.018 −.031
0–16 months (.006)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗ (.009)∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗
[.066] [.06] [.071] [.058] [.072]
Additional birth .084 .08 .089 .095 .078
17–28 months (.01)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.015)∗∗∗ (.013)∗∗∗
[.193] [.203] [.183] [.206] [.183]
Additional birth −.021 −.031 −.013 −.042 −.008
29–120 months (.012)∗ (.017)∗ (.017) (.018)∗∗ (.016)
[.36] [.353] [.366] [.348] [.369]
(B) Labor market outcomes
Return to work −.11 −.103 −.124 −.137 −.094
0–36 months (.012)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.018)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗
[.564] [.632] [.496] [.647] [.5]
Return to work −.027 −.028 −.029 −.039 −.018
0–120 months (.009)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗ (.014)∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.013)
[.847] [.874] [.82] [.889] [.814]
Employment −1.023 −1.186 −1.15 −1.054 −.556
0–36 months (.114)∗∗∗ (.101)∗∗∗ (.114)∗∗∗ (.102)∗∗∗ (.172)∗∗∗
[2.594] [1.984] [2.659] [1.913] [1.505]
Employment .2 −.125 .071 .026 .238
37–120 months (.173) (.162) (.171) (.163) (.286)
[5.88] [4.762] [5.95] [4.681] [3.92]
Earnings −3.548 −2.7 −3.914 −2.347 −2.356
0–36 months (.56)∗∗∗ (.354)∗∗∗ (.564)∗∗∗ (.335)∗∗∗ (.748)∗∗∗
[14.247] [7.183] [13.921] [7.454] [6.508]
Earnings 1.142 .311 .45 .895 −.403
37–120 months (.927) (.64) (.923) (.614) (1.465)
[26.467] [16.139] [26.336] [16.183] [17.179]
Observations 6,180 3,087 3,093 2,705 3,475
Source. ASSD, own calculations. Sample covers women giving birth to their first child in June 1–30 (12
months PL) or July 1–30 (24 months PL) in the year 1990.
Notes. This table reports the “July 1990” parameter estimate in linear regressions/linear probability
models comparing postbirth labor market outcomes of mothers giving birth to their first child in June and
July 1990. Standard error in parentheses; mean of dependent variable in brackets. Employment and earnings
are set to zero for women who do not hold a job. Zeros are included in all our analyses. ∗ (∗∗ ,∗∗∗) denote
significance at the 10% (5%,1%) level, respectively. Inference based on Huber–White standard errors. All:
repeats column (2) of Table 4 and column (2) of Table 5 for comparison. Hi/lo wage: median splits for prebirth
daily income; Wt/bl col: splits by white- and blue-collar occupation; wage and occupation measured one year
prior to birth; women who are not employed one year prior to birth are allocated to the low-wage and blue-collar
categories.
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to almost four children per 100 high-wage mothers and to almost
seven children per 100 low-wage mothers (row (1)). This result
suggests that taking advantage of automatic renewal is less at-
tractive to high-wage women than to low-wage women. Long-run
fertility effects disappear for women with high earnings power
(1.6-percentage-point difference) but not for women whose pre-
birth earnings power lies below the median (6.4-percentage-point
difference). Rows (3)–(5) in Table VI assess the timing of fertility.
High-wage women delay fertility more than low-wage women up
to month 16 (when control women also have access to automatic
renewal, row (3)). From month 17 to 28 (when the treated have
access to automatic renewal but controls do not; row (4)), treated
high- and low-wage women display excess fertility of eight and
nine children per 100 women, respectively. In the period follow-
ing month 29, high-wage (but not low-wage) controls have sig-
nificantly higher fertility (row (5)). In sum, excess fertility for
low-wage women results from not delaying initial fertility by the
treated and from not catching up by the controls after automatic
renewal has lapsed.
These differences in fertility timing are likely to be explained
by differences in work attachment between high-wage women
(63% return to work within three years, row (6), number in brack-
ets) and low-wage women (only 50% return to work within three
years, row (6), number in brackets). Because returning to work
between children induces a wider space between first birth and
second birth, offering automatic renewal compresses the space be-
tween children more strongly for the group with a larger ex ante
space between births.
Interestingly, although there are significant differences in
fertility responses between high- and low-wage women, the PL
reform affects employment and earnings of high- and low-wage
women to a similar extent (Panel B in Table VI). The decrease in
return-to-work probabilities is somewhat smaller for high-wage
women than for low-wage women in the short run but almost
identical in the long run (rows (6) and (7)). The reduction in
employment is identical for both groups in the short run and
in the long run (rows (8) and (9)). Short-run earnings reduc-
tions are greater for high-wage women than for low-wage women
(row (10)). However, because employment responses are nearly
identical, differential earnings responses arguably reflect ex ante
differences in earnings power rather than differential earnings
consequences of extending PL duration. There are no significant
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long-run earnings consequences of extended career interruptions
(row (11)).
Turning to fertility results by occupation reveals that short-
run and long-run fertility responses are quite similar for white-
collar and blue-collar women (columns (4) and (5), rows (1) and
(2)): three additional children within 10 years. Yet even though the
long-run result is similar, the time pattern of the responses differs
somewhat between white- and blue-collar women (rows (3)–(5)).
Both blue- and white-collar women delay second-child fertility
in the period, giving both treated and control women access to
automatic renewal (row (3)); both blue- and white-collar women
eligible for extended PL concentrate births of second children in
the period with access to automatic renewal (row (4)). Yet white-
collar control women catch up to treated women more strongly
than blue-collar control women in the postrenewal period (row
(5)). This pattern of results is, again, consistent with differential
postbirth labor market attachment between white-collar women
(65% return to job within three years, row (6)) and blue-collar
women (50% return to job within three years, row (6)).
Although occupation does not appear to mediate fertility re-
sponses of extended leave strongly, occupation is important for the
labor market consequences of extended PL (Panel B in Table VI).
About 14 of 100 treated white-collar women do not return to work
within three years because of extended PL. In contrast, only 9 of
100 blue-collar women delay return to work in the short run (row
(6)). Long-run return to work of blue-collar women is not affected,
whereas almost 4 of 100 women in the white-collar group do not
return to work within ten years (row (7)). Extended PL reduces
employment and earnings more strongly for white-collar women
than for blue-collar women in the short run (rows (8) and (10)).
However, in the long run PL-induced career interruptions are not
harmful (rows (9) and (11)). In sum, the results suggest that la-
bor market outcomes of white-collar women are more sensitive to
extending PL.
We conclude that the finding of higher fertility responses for
low-wage women than for high-wage women suggests that cash
transfers (through their impact on replacement ratios) are im-
portant determinants of fertility responses. Finding that there
are no differences in fertility responses between blue- and white-
collar workers suggests that the job protection provisions are of
importance for white-collar women. White-collar women have, on
average, higher incomes than blue-collar women and, on the basis
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of their lower average replacement ratios, they should also react
less strongly to the PL extension. It seems that lower replacement
ratios are compensated by the benefits of job protection. This inter-
pretation is consistent with the idea that internal labor markets
and career concerns are more important for white-collar jobs but
less relevant for blue-collar workers.26
V. EXTENDING PL DURATION FOR THE FUTURE CHILD
This section assesses the effect of extended leave on the future
child (“future-child PL effect”).27 To identify this effect we compare
the June 1990 cohort (eligible for a one-year PL for the current
child but for a two-year PL for the future child) to the June 1987
cohort (one-year PL for the current child and one-year PL for any
second child born within three years after the first birth).
The June 1990 to June 1987 contrast may be biased due to
cohort effects and time trends. Hence Table VII presents a range
of supplementary analyses that shed light on the plausibility of
the key identifying assumption of identical ex ante fertility plans
and labor market trajectories for two cohorts. Assessing the sen-
sitivity of our results to time trends, we provide (i) a placebo
estimate of the reform among PL-ineligible mothers (column (3)),
(ii) estimates of a three-year postreform time trend that com-
pares July 1993 mothers to July 1990 mothers (column (4)), and
(iii) estimates of a two-year prereform time trend that compares
June 1987 mothers to June 1985 mothers (column (5)).28 Moreover,
26. Our results also relate to the existing literature on the trade-off between
fertility and labor supply. In contrast to our long-run results, Angrist and Evans
(1998) find that U.S. women with two children worked less than women with
just one child in 1990. There are at least two reasons for the differences in our
results. First, Angrist and Evans (1998) do not condition on time since birth. Their
finding of a reduction in labor for the average mother could be consistent with a
temporary reduction in labor supply in the short run but no reduction of labor
supply in the long run—the situation we document for Austria. Second, Austria
and the United States differ in terms of female labor force participation. In 1994,
the earliest year with comparable OECD statistics, 65% of American working-age
women participated in the labor market whereas only 59% of Austrian women
did. Because these participation differences presumably reflect differences in the
speed of postbirth labor market reentry, a second child is likely to crowd out more
employment in the United States than in Austria. Thus, the fertility effects of
extended parental leave may come at higher long-run employment cost in countries
with high postbirth labor market participation.
27. Note that, although the change in the PL system could in principle also
affect first-child, third-child fertility, and so forth, we confine our analysis to the
analysis of second-child fertility because for this parity the effects should be most
pronounced.
28. The prereform time trend cannot be three years because our ASSD extract
starts in 1985.
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TABLE VII
THE EFFECT OF PL DURATION FOR THE FUTURE CHILD (1990 REFORM)
Base Controls Ineligible Posttrend Pretrend
(A) Short-run effects (0–36 months after birth)
Additional birth .069 .068 −.019 −.006 .001
(.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.051) (.012) (.011)
[.286] [.286] [.236] [.364] [.25]
Return to work −.002 −.003 −.053 .008 .018
(.013) (.012) (.038) (.012) (.012)
[.622] [.622] [.135] [.524] [.614]
Employment −.183 −.164 −.336 −.103 −.045
(.084)∗∗ (.083)∗∗ (.216) (.058)∗ (.086)
[2.799] [2.799] [.583] [1.71] [2.909]
Earnings −.181 −.229 .512 −.75 −.589
(.361) (.331) (1.927) (.282)∗∗∗ (.325)∗
[11.68] [11.68] [9.031] [8.974] [11.849]
(B) Medium-run effects (37–72 months after birth)
Additional birth −.019 −.014 −.072 −.011 .033
(.011)∗ (.011) (.047) (.01) (.011)∗∗∗
[.21] [.21] [.182] [.179] [.205]
Return to work .028 .024 .011 .022 .005
(.009)∗∗∗ (.01)∗∗ (.043) (.011)∗∗ (.009)
[.158] [.158] [.156] [.227] [.144]
Employment −.172 −.191 −.492 .315 −.007
(.123) (.122) (.397) (.117)∗∗∗ (.125)
[4.585] [4.585] [1.599] [4.77] [4.688]
Earnings −.13 −.325 −.252 .441 .053
(.547) (.523) (2.285) (.524) (.498)
[17.015] [17.015] [13.084] [18.654] [16.814]
Observations 5,977 5,977 274 6,406 5,892
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample covers eligible and ineligible women giving birth to their first
child in June or July of the years listed in the notes.
Notes: This table reports the “After” parameter estimate in linear regressions/linear probability models
comparing postbirth labor market outcomes of mothers giving birth to their first child in June or July of
various years. Standard error in parentheses; mean of dependent variable in brackets. Employment and
earnings are set to zero for women who do not hold a job. Zeros are included in all our analyses. ∗(∗∗ ,∗∗∗)
denote significance at the 10% (5%,1%) level, respectively. Inference based on Huber–White standard errors.
Base: eligible, June 1990 (24 months PL for second child, 12 months PL for first child) and June 1987 (12
months PL for first and second child). Controls: adds controls (Table II) to Base. Ineligible: ineligible with
controls, June 1990 vs. June 1987. Posttrend: eligible with controls, June 1993 vs. July 1990. Pretrend: eligible
with controls, June 1987 vs. June 1985.
Table VII distinguishes between months 0–36 after the first birth
(where second-child duration differs) and months 37–72 after the
first birth (where second-child duration is identical).29
29. Note that the inverse pattern of eligibility holds for the pre- and post-
reform trend cohorts. Prereform cohorts are eligible for the same second-child
PL duration during months 0–36 after the first birth, but PL duration differs
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Results indicate that the future-child PL effect is quantita-
tively important (Table VII). Short-run fertility is 7 percentage
points higher for June 1990 mothers than for June 1987 mothers
(Panel A of Table VII, row (1)). Adding prebirth characteristics
does not change this result. We do not find that PL-ineligible
June 1990 women tend to give birth to more future children than
PL-ineligible June 1987 women (column (3)). We also do not find
a high importance of time trends. Higher-order fertility is simi-
lar between July 1993 and July 1990 mothers (column (4)) and is
also similar between between June 1987 and June 1985 mothers
(column (5)).
Interestingly, extending leave for the future child does not
appear to affect labor market outcomes to any great extent (rows
(2)–(4) of Panel A in Table VII). Return to work and earnings do not
display statistically significant effects (rows (2) and (4)). Although
work experience is reduced significantly, estimates indicate that
treated mothers work 0.2 months per year less.30
Panel B in Table VII shows that the short-run fertility effect
persists in the medium run. Our results indicate that there is
no significant catch-up of control mothers during months 36–72.
Although June 1990 mothers give birth to slightly fewer second
children than June 1987 mothers, the effect is quite small (1.4
children per 100 women) and not statistically significant. Fur-
thermore, results on PL-ineligible women are insignificant. The
last two columns of Panel B of Table VII show time-trend results.
More precisely, these results measure time trends plus future-
child differences in PL duration in the medium run. For instance,
pretrend estimates compare June 1987 mothers who are covered
by a two-year leave in the medium run (months 36–72 cover the pe-
riod from July 1990 to June 1993) and June 1985 mothers who are
covered by a one-year leave for the first two years and a two-year
leave for the third year (months 36–72 cover the period from July
1988 to June 1991). Consistent with this pattern of PL eligibility,
during months 37–72 after the first birth. In the prereform time trend analysis,
for instance, second children of June 1987 mothers are eligible for 24 months of PL
duration in months 37–60 after the first birth, whereas second children of June
1985 mothers are still only eligible for 12 months of PL duration. In months 61–72
after the first birth, both second children of both cohorts are eligible for 24 months
of PL duration.
30. Note that employment estimates could be spurious because there is a
significantly negative postreform trend in employment (column (3), Table VII).
Moreover, the coefficients on labor market outcomes are very imprecise, so the data
are consistent with zero effects but also with large negative effects on employment
and earnings.
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the future-child PL effect is 3 percentage points higher for the
June 1987 cohort than for the June 1985 cohort.31 Posttrend esti-
mates capture the fact that second-child leave is reduced from 24
months to 18 months for July 1993 mothers, whereas July 1990
mothers still have access to a two-year leave. Point estimates are
quantitatively consistent with the future-child effects estimated
above but are not statistically significant.
Except for a small increase in return to work, we do not find
large future-child PL effect on medium-run labor market out-
comes.
What can we learn from the current-child and future-child
effects? Recall that the current-child estimates compare fami-
lies with different benefits (in terms of transfers and time for
care) for the current child but identical benefits for the future
child. Abstracting from automatic renewal, extending parental
leave should crowd out short-run postbirth labor market partici-
pation but leave fertility decisions unaffected. In contrast, future-
child estimates compare families with different benefits for the
future child but identical benefits for the current child. Extending
parental leave should affect fertility decisions but not crowd out
short-run postbirth labor market participation.
Turning to results, we find that extending parental leave for
the current child reduces short-run postbirth work experience by
one month, whereas the corresponding future-child effect is about
one-fifth of a month. Thus, the pattern of labor market results is
in line with the pattern of incentives. In contrast, whereas extend-
ing parental leave for the future child boosts short-run fertility by
7 percentage points, doing so for the current child also increases
short-run fertility by 5 percentage points. Thus, fertility results
suggest that access to automatic renewal is valuable; indeed al-
most as valuable as extended leave for a future child.
VI. REDUCING PL DURATION
This section discusses the effects of the 1996 reduction of
PL. Results comparing mothers giving birth to their first child
in July 1996 (eligible for eighteen months of leave) with mothers
31. The effect is about one-half of the short-run estimate in row (1), column
(2), of Table VII. This lower importance of extended leave for a future child can
probably be explained by two facts. First, the prereform control group of June
1985 mothers gets access to extended leave in the period 61–72 months after
birth. Second, mothers might be less responsive to extended leave three to six
years after birth than zero to three years after birth.
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TABLE VIII
THE EFFECTS OF REDUCING PL DURATION FOR THE CURRENT CHILD (1996 REFORM):
JUNE 1996 (24 MONTHS PL) VS. JULY 1996 (18 MONTHS PL)
Base Controls Half-window Anticipation Placebo
(A) Fertility
Additional birth −.003 −.001 −.025 .003 −.021
0–36 months (.012) (.012) (.017) (.014) (.012)∗
[.321] [.321] [.331] [.309] [.349]
Additional birth .028 .028 .023 .022 −.021
0–22 months (.009)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.013)∗ (.01)∗∗ (.009)∗∗
[.152] [.152] [.157] [.148] [.151]
Additional birth −.03 −.029 −.032 −.028 .001
23–28 months (.008)∗∗∗ (.008)∗∗∗ (.011)∗∗∗ (.009)∗∗∗ (.008)
[.103] [.103] [.109] [.098] [.122]
Additional birth .004 .005 −.013 .013 −.003
29–36 months (.007) (.007) (.01) (.008)∗ (.007)
[.077] [.077] [.076] [.076] [.084]
(B) Labor market outcomes
Return to work .051 .053 .058 .047 .003
0–36 months (.012)∗∗∗ (.012)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗ (.014)∗∗∗ (.012)
[.661] [.661] [.66] [.663] [.536]
Employment .675 .684 .703 .676 .057
0–36 months (.069)∗∗∗ (.067)∗∗∗ (.095)∗∗∗ (.076)∗∗∗ (.056)
[2.456] [2.456] [2.46] [2.487] [1.729]
Earnings 2.65 2.697 2.295 3.045 −.267
0–36 months (.367)∗∗∗ (.321)∗∗∗ (.444)∗∗∗ (.371)∗∗∗ (.264)
[12.302] [12.302] [12.148] [12.469] [9.135]
Source: ASSD, own calculations. Sample: PL-eligible women giving birth to their first child in June 1–30
(24 months PL) or July 1–30 (18 months PL) in the year 1996.
Notes. This table reports the “July 1996” parameter estimate in linear regressions/linear probability
models comparing outcomes of mothers giving birth to their first child in June or July 1996. Standard error
in parentheses; mean of dependent variable in brackets. Employment and earnings are set to zero for women
who do not hold a job. Zeros are included in all our analyses. ∗ (∗∗ ,∗∗∗) denote significance at the 10% (5%,1%)
level, respectively. Inference based on Huber–White standard errors. Base: July (18 months PL) vs. June (24
months PL). Controls: adds controls (Table II). Half-window: June 16–July 15. Anticipation: June 1–23 and
July 8–30. Placebo: June 1993 (24 months PL) vs. July 1993 (24 months PL).
giving birth to their first child in June 1996 (eligible for 24 months
of leave) indicate, first, that the number of children born within
three years is not affected by the partial reversal of the 1990 pol-
icy change (Table VIII, row (1)). Second, although the number of
children is unaffected, the timing of second-child fertility is signif-
icantly altered. There is excess future-child fertility of about 3%
before month 22 (when both treated and control mothers have ac-
cess to PL renewal) and a decrease of the same order of magnitude
during months 23–28 (when the treated lose access to PL renewal;
Table VIII, rows (2)–(4)). Reducing PL duration strongly affects
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the timing of births but not the number of children being born
because, arguably, mothers could take advantage of PL renewal
before and after the 1996 reform, whereas the 1990 reform repre-
sents a switch from a system where PL renewal was not feasible
to a system where it become highly attractive.32
Third, reducing PL duration affects return to work, employ-
ment, and earnings considerably. In the short run, 5 of 100 women
return to work within three years who would not with extended
leave (Table VIII, row (5)). Women on the 18-month leave also
work on the average about 0.7 months more per year and earn
3 euros more per day more than women with access to a two-year
PL (Table VIII, rows (6) and (7)). Notice that the six-month re-
duction in PL duration affects return to work, employment, and
earnings by about half as much (in absolute value) as the twelve-
month extension of PL duration in 1990. Hence results for the
1996 reform confirm that that PL duration for the current child
has a strong impact on short-run labor market outcomes.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The focus of this paper is the relevance of the duration of
job-protected, paid PL for higher-order fertility and labor market
outcomes of working women. The empirical analysis is based on a
1990 extension of PL duration from one year to two years and on
a 1996 reduction of PL from two years to eighteen months.
We find that extending PL affects fertility via two channels.
First, increasing leave for the current child opens up the possi-
bility of renewing PL benefits without going back to work. The
resulting tighter spacing of births gives rise to both excess short-
run fertility (5 additional children per 100 women within three
years) and excess long-run fertility (3 additional children per 100
women within ten years). Moreover, increasing leave for the fu-
ture child reduces the cost of care for that child, inducing mothers
to give birth to about 7 additional second children per 100 women.
This means that extending job-protected paid PL with automatic
renewal from one year to two years induces mothers to give birth
to about 12 additional children per 100 women. Regarding the
labor market consequences of extended leave, we find that most
32. We also investigate the effects of reducing PL duration for the future child
by comparing mothers who give birth to a first child in June 1996 to mothers who
give birth to a first child in June 1993. Findings indicate that reduced leave on the
future child is associated with a decrease in short-run fertility.
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mothers exhaust the full duration of their leaves; that return to
work is substantially delayed even after PL has been exhausted;
and that prolonging leave leads to significant short-run reduc-
tions in employment and earnings but only minor effects in the
long run. Fertility and labor market responses are heterogeneous
with respect to earnings and occupation on the prebirth job. This
is consistent with both replacement rates and job protection me-
diating the effects of extended leave on fertility and labor market
responses. Finally, our findings indicate that the 1996 reduction
of PL duration compresses the space between first and second
births, but does not have a significant effect on the number of
second children born within three years. Moreover, the labor mar-
ket responses closely mirror those of the 1990 extension of PL
duration.
Providing causal evidence on how Austrian policy changes af-
fect fertility and labor market careers is interesting and important
for the non-Austrian public. In many countries fertility levels have
fallen strongly and the question of whether PL policies can help
to increase fertility is hotly debated. Our results show that such
policies can have a quite strong impact and that both transfers
and job protection matter for fertility responses. Our analysis of
labor market effects addresses the issue of whether too generous
PL rules might have a negative impact on mothers’ subsequent
work careers—an issue of paramount importance. We think the
Austrian case is interesting in this respect because the 1990 PL
reform was a move from a system of average generosity (by cur-
rent OECD standards) to a system of high generosity. Although we
do find that the PL extension increases the proportion of women
who never return to work, we do not find detrimental effects on
employment and earnings over an extended time horizon. Hence
we conclude that generous PL policies do not necessarily harm
women’s long-run labor market outcomes.
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